INTRODUCTION
In recent years, genetic engineering has resulted in the development of a number of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many of these are genetically modified (or genetically engineered) (GM) crops. These crops and their products are used for food and feed.
production. Spanish farmers cultivated the largest number of hectares, and farmers in six other EU Member States -the Czech Republic, Romania, Portugal, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia -also grew biotech maize. 6 Most EU Member States have no officially recognised GM hectares, and several (for example, Austria, Hungary, France) have attempted to ban cultivation of GM maize. 7 In both the United States and the European Union, the cultivation of genetically modified crops must coexist with other agricultural systems. 8 In the United States, where GM crops make up a large majority of important crops such as soybeans and maize, the rate of adoption indicates that producers are enthusiastic about the benefits of GM crops. Consumers, in contrast, often lack specialised knowledge about biotechnology and its food products.
Many producers use conventional or traditional systems and often apply fertilizers and pesticides on their crops. Organic systems do not usually use chemical fertilizers or pesticides, nor do they use GM materials in the production process. When GM, conventional, and organic systems of agricultural production occur in the same geographic region, producers who use organic or conventional systems often want to avoid the 'adventitious presence' of GM material in their crops. The coexistence of GM with traditional and organic farming is therefore a contentious issue, particularly in the European Union. 9 Nonetheless, according to survey results published in 2008, the majority of US consumers would purchase food developed from biotechnology, especially if it offered specific benefits. About 84 per cent of consumers expressed a favourable or neutral impression of plant biotechnology. Moreover, only one per cent of respondents listed biotechnology as a primary food-safety concern. 10 Although EC policy favours development of biotechnology, including GM agricultural crops, welcome from governments, producers or consumers. 12 The EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development noted that tensions in Europe about GMOs often reflect different goals. 13 Farmers who focus on enhanced competitiveness see an important role for GMOs, while others prefer traditional or organic practices and fear economic harm from the adventitious presence of GM material. Some European consumers value 'quality production' and products 'linked to traditional practices and geographical origin'; others prefer organic foods.
14 These values are consistent with the European model of agriculture that balances socioeconomic, as well as environmental and territorial considerations. Some consumers believe that GMOs are not compatible with traditional production. Indeed, an organisation called GMO-free Europe calculated that 289 regions in Europe have declared themselves GM-free or would like to restrict GM crops, and 4567 local governments would also like to restrict GM in their territories. 15 The following Parts of this article describe the regulatory systems for GMOs and GM food (and feed) in the United States and the European Union and provide a brief comparison of regulatory approaches in the United States and Europe.
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid Term Review of the Strategy on Life Sciences and Biotechnology COM (2007) 175 final (10 April 2007)
. 12 A survey indicated that 58 per cent of Europeans (a majority in most Member States) oppose use of GMOs, though lack of information may contribute to the opposition: European Commission, Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment (Special Eurobarometer 295 (2008)), 65-6. 13 Friends of the Earth Europe, an NGO suspicious of GM technology, asserted that: 'GMO contamination is a new type of pollution created by industry. It involves living and replicating organisms, and because it involves the building blocks of life (genes), is irreversible as well as increasing over time. It can occur at any stage along the food chain as a result of natural processes and human intervention: from seed production, to crop growing, to harvesting, to storage, to transport, to processing and packaging. 
II REGULATION OF GM CROPS AND FOOD PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, federal policy, laws, and regulations govern testing and commercialisation of crops and food produced through biotechnology. Developers of new GM varieties comply with federal laws and regulations and they participate in consultations recommended by federal agency guidelines. Federal regulation focuses on plant health, environmental protection, and food and feed safety. Though states share these concerns, most states agree that the federal government should bear primary responsibility in these areas, 16 and states play no statutory role in federal regulation of GM crops. 17 Many states have enacted general or specific statutory provisions that apply to biotechnology,
18
A Policy but this article focuses on the comprehensive federal regulation of biotechnology.
The 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology established US policy for GMOs, and the Coordinated Framework continues to influence federal policy. Recognising important commercial opportunities from biotechnology, the Coordinated Framework acknowledged questions about the adequacy of existing laws, regulations, and review processes for products of biotechnology. 19 Ultimately, the Coordinated Framework concluded that products of biotechnology are not fundamentally different from conventional products; that the product, rather than the process, should be regulated; and that regulatory jurisdiction over products of biotechnology (as over traditional products) should be based on their use. The Coordinated Framework relied on existing federal laws and agency expertise to govern GMOs. Three federal agencies carry out the most important responsibilities. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) ensures that GMOs are safe to grow; the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ensures that they are safe for the environment; and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA, along with the EPA) ensures that they are safe to eat. 21 Policies articulated in the Coordinated Framework continue to influence Agency action, though new laws and regulations have been enacted since 1986. 22 In recent years, development and field testing of new GM varieties have increased risks and triggered the need for new regulatory measures. A 2002 policy document outlined plans of the lead agencies to strengthen regulation and enhance oversight. 23 The USDA had already made field testing requirements for permits more stringent for GMOs intended for pharmaceutical or industrial products (rather than commodity crops) and also planned to update its GM regulations. 24 21 Ibid 23,309-50, where agencies set out their policies for GMOs. In addition to the three leading agencies, the Coordinated Framework included policy from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for safety and health of workers and from the National Institutes of Health for conduct of research. Federal research supports the federal regulatory structure.
The FDA planned to publish guidelines to encourage the early evaluation of crops with new non-pesticidal proteins so that new crops would not raise food safety issues -caused, for example, by toxins or allergens that might escape into seeds, commodities, or food. The EPA planned to publish guidance on the conduct of safety reviews of low-level residues and containment controls during field trials and to review its requirements for experimental use permits and containment 22 The Government Accountability Office recommended improvement in coordination of agency efforts and monitoring of GM crops: Government Accountability Office, Genetically controls to minimise gene flow from field trials. 25 These proposals were designed to reduce the unintended presence of low levels of GM material in seeds, commodities and food until safety standards had been met, and thus to protect public health and the environment and to increase public confidence in the effectiveness of regulatory oversight of GM foods.
26
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USDA -Plant Protection Act
Though some of these proposals have been carried out, others are still in progress.
The United States Department of Agriculture regulatory framework is science-based and focuses on safe development and use of GM plants. 33 Performance standards for field trials under the notification procedure help to ensure that the field trial will not cause environmental or economic harm. Anyone conducting a field trial must allow inspection of facilities and records and report results of field tests and any unusual occurrence to APHIS.
34
The more rigorous permit procedure applies to experimental releases of GM plants that pose higher risks, for example, plants modified with certain human or animal genetic material and those that produce industrial or pharmaceutical compounds. 35 The permit requires detailed technical data and specific information about experimental design, geographic location, plans to prevent escape and dissemination, and final disposal.
36 APHIS reviews the application 37 and, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 38 2009. Between 1987 and 2007, APHIS authorised almost 19,000 notifications and 4,300 permits; over 13,000 were for field trials: GAO, GE Crops, above n 22, 11. prepares an environmental assessment followed, if necessary, by an environmental impact statement. After review of the application and accompanying data, APHIS will grant or deny (with reasons and subject to appeal) the permit. The permit will include conditions to ensure that introduction of the plant will not disseminate or establish plant pests. The permit holder must report the results of field tests and notify APHIS promptly 32 7 CFR § 340.3(b)(1)- (6) 
Petitions for Deregulation
When field tests indicate that a new GM variety is not a plant pest and poses no threat to agriculture or the environment, the variety is ready to be commercialised. The next step is a petition for determination of 'nonregulated status'. 40 The petition explains why the organism should no longer be regulated. The applicant provides detailed information about the organism, including information that would be 'unfavorable to a petition'. 41 Results of field tests are an important part of the petition, and data must substantiate the conclusion that the GM plant is 'unlikely to pose a greater plant pest risk than the unmodified organism from which it was derived'.
42
APHIS reviews the risk of the regulated variety to determine whether it can be released safely into the environment. Any information known to the petitioner that indicates that a regulated article may pose a greater plant pest risk than the unmodified recipient organism shall also be included': at § 340.6(c)(4). 43 APHIS prepares a preliminary assessment, then accepts and reviews public comments before preparation of the final assessment. Further NEPA analysis to address concerns about the use of regulated products will be done by the agency that reviews or approves the product, taking into account the APHIS review.
variety may have a significant impact, APHIS must prepare an environmental impact statement. 44 On the basis of the environmental assessment or environmental impact statement and other documentation, APHIS makes the determination of nonregulated status or, less often, denies the petition. 45 If the petition is granted, the organism can move freely in commerce, provided that it also meets the regulatory requirements of the FDA and EPA. As of February 2009, APHIS had granted 75 petitions, and 14 were pending. 46 Because nonregulated status means that a variety poses no environmental or agricultural risk, APHIS no longer has authority over that variety. Should it later become a plant pest, however, it will again be subject to regulation. No pesticide can be marketed and used in the United States until it has been registered.
A common example of a PIP is the pesticide frequently used in GM crops, Bt (bacillus thuringiensis). 67 A pesticide can be registered if the applicant can show that its composition warrants the registrant's claims, its labelling complies with FIFRA and, when used in accordance with normal practice, it does not 'cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment'.
68
The EPA uses the FIFRA registration system to collect data on the safety, efficacy and environmental effects of PIPs. 69 Field tests of unregistered PIPs, authorised by experimental use permits, allow the developer to gather information for its own use and to support registration. 70 If a field test is reasonably expected to result in a food residue, the EPA may establish a temporary food tolerance (a legal limit on the maximum amount of the substance in or on food) under the FDCA before issuing the permit.
71 Some field tests 'are presumed not to involve unreasonable adverse effects' therefore do not require a permit. Laboratory or greenhouse tests are presumed to be exempt. A small-scale test on a cumulative total of no more than ten acres of land per target pest does not require an experimental use permit, but any food or feed crops involved in the test must be destroyed or eaten by experimental animals unless the EPA has established a food tolerance (or exemption) for residues.
73
The EPA encourages those conducting field trials to consult with the Agency to discuss confinement of the tested PIP. Physical or biological controls that comply with APHIS requirements will generally satisfy the EPA. As a result of the consultation, the EPA may recommend that the developer seek a temporary food tolerance, or the Agency may require an experimental use permit.
74
In April 2007, the EPA sought public comments on possible new regulations for PIPs, which are governed in part by general regulations that apply to all pesticides. 75 Because PIPs are produced and used in a living plant, they differ from pesticides intended for external physical application. 76 EPA regulations that govern the registration of pesticide establishments and pesticide production are not completely appropriate for PIPs, which present unique regulatory issues. 77 Therefore the EPA plans to codify new data requirements for pesticide registration of PIPs to reflect current scientific advances and to 'improve the Agency's ability to make regulatory decisions about human health and environmental effects of PIP pesticides to better protect wildlife, the environment and people'. The FDCA governed pesticide residues in the same way as other food additives until the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act 79 removed pesticide residues from the definition of food additives and from the controversial food additive Delaney Clause. 80 The FDCA now provides that raw or processed food or feed that contains pesticide chemical residues is considered adulterated and cannot be moved in interstate commerce, unless the residue complies with an established tolerance or has been exempted from the tolerance requirement. 81 The EPA sets pesticide tolerances for foods (or establishes an exemption), and the FDA enforces those pesticide tolerances. The EPA may establish a tolerance only if it is 'safe'.
Residues of PIPs in foods (including food produced during field tests) are subject to this requirement. 82 The EPA may grant exemptions, either temporary or permanent, from the tolerance requirement if tests indicate that the pesticidal protein is neither toxic nor allergenic and there is 'a reasonable certainty that no harm will result' from aggregate exposure. 83 Scientific data must support requests for tolerances or exemptions.
84 By regulation, the EPA has granted both temporary and permanent exemptions to PIPs in GM crops, for example, various proteins associated with Bt crops. authorises the FDA to regulate the safety of food and feed, including non-pesticidal GM foods from new plant varieties. In regulating food safety, the FDA relies primarily on 80 provisions that prohibit adulteration of food and govern food additives. 87 The FDA insists that those who introduce a new food have legal responsibility to evaluate its safety and to ensure that it meets the requirements of the FDCA. 88 FDA policy for GM foods is influenced by the Agency's belief that GM varieties and their food products 'are as safe and nutritious as their traditional counterparts'. 89 
FDA Policy
Because new plant varieties had been developed safely, the FDA did not routinely conduct pre-market safety reviews of new foods derived from plants. In its 1992 Policy Statement, the Agency adopted a similar approach to GM foods. 90 The FDA expected most transferred genetic material to be safe, but genetic modification could cause changes -for example, in structure, function, or composition -that require evaluation to ensure food safety.
91 If necessary to protect public health, the FDA has authority to require premarket review and approval of new foods. 92 The FDA indicated that it would focus on the food product, rather than the process by which the food was produced:
The regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by which it is developed, is dependent upon objective characteristics of the food and the 87 95 It is not a safety assessment, but involves a 'comparative approach and embodies the idea that existing traditionally produced foods can serve as a reference to evaluate the safety of genetically modified foods'. 96 That is, if a GM food product and its conventional counterpart do not differ in nutritional (or anti-nutritional) components, the GM product is considered to be substantially equivalent. 97 The FDA subjects to premarket review only foods that lack substantial equivalence -that is, foods with characteristics that carry higher risk (for example, toxin levels or a new substance).
98
The FDA proposed, but may never implement, a requirement that it receive notice at least 120 days before commercial distribution of most bioengineered foods, including those derived from new GM plants with pesticidal 93 substances. This measure would allow the FDA to ensure that plant-derived bioengineered foods comply with the FDCA, particularly in situations where unintended changes in foods might raise questions of harm to health or misbranding. Because most modifications would not raise such questions, the FDA did not plan to require premarket approval for all GM foods or to require special labels. 99 At the same time, the FDA published a Draft Guidance on voluntary labelling, 100 
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Guidance Documents which has not been finalised.
The FDA often communicates with its own staff, industry, and the public through guidance documents. These documents, less formal than regulations, reflect the Agency's current thinking, but do not legally bind the FDA or the public.
101
The FDA's 1992 Policy Statement indicated that 'prudent' developers of foods using new technologies, including new plant varieties, would consult with the FDA before commercial distribution of foods or feed from new plant varieties. 102 In 1997, therefore, the FDA published a 'Guidance on Consultation Procedures' for industry, listing information (including safety and nutritional assessments) that should be submitted to the FDA and describing the procedure for consultation. 103 The FDA recommended initial biotechnology consultations on new plant varieties prior to commercialisation, other consultations as necessary, and a final consultation once the developer has documentation -including detailed safety and nutritional assessments -to show that its new product is safe. FDA scientists review the data to identify unresolved scientific and regulatory issues. In 2006, the FDA issued another guidance document, which recommended early food safety evaluation of certain new GM food varieties. perhaps in part to avoid liability triggered by unsafe foods. 106 Recognising the likelihood of cross-pollination from field tests and commingling of seeds, the FDA addressed the possibility of 'inadvertent, intermittent, low-level presence in the food supply of proteins that have not been evaluated through the FDA's voluntary consultation process'. 107 Questions about the safety of a new protein should be resolved before the developer carries out any activity that could result in the protein entering the food supply. The guidance document therefore encourages developers to submit food safety data about new proteins early (perhaps at the time of field tests), before those new proteins enter the food supply via pollen flow or commingling. 108 Early food safety evaluation precedes the biotechnology consultation, which occurs when developers plan to commercialise new plant varieties. Developers can use data from the food safety evaluation in the later consultation.
109
E
FDA Regulation
Food Additives
The FDA governs GM food under its authority to regulate food additives. Under the FDCA, a food is adulterated if it bears or contains an added 'poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health', an unsafe pesticide residue, or an unsafe additive. 110 A food additive is considered unsafe unless it has been granted premarket approval or is exempt from approval. 111 To gain approval of a new food additive, the manufacturer submits a food additive petition, accompanied by studies to prove the safety of the additive. Approval requires that the FDA be convinced that the proposed use of the additive is safe, 112 with 'a reasonable certainty ... that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use'.
113 If the FDA finds the additive safe, it will issue a regulation to that effect; otherwise additives are considered unsafe and therefore the food is adulterated.
114
Most non-pesticidal GM foods escape rigorous premarket review as food additives under the GRAS concept. 115 The FDCA definition of food additive 116 excludes substances 'generally recognised as safe' (GRAS).
117
Substances that are GRAS -including many ingredients from natural sources and some chemical additives -are not food additives and are therefore exempt from regulation as food additives. GRAS, however, requires 'the same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food additive regulation for the ingredient'.
119
The FDA concluded in 1992 that most GM foods will be considered GRAS because most new plant foods had been accepted widely as safe. 120 The use of the GRAS concept for foods produced through biotechnology lets the Agency 'take advantage of the dual purposes of the [Food Additives Amendment] -ensuring safety and fostering innovation by relying on the use of sound scientific judgment based on good science'.
121 A lawsuit challenged the FDA's 1992 policy and its determination that most GM foods will be GRAS. Holding that the FDA's presumption of GRAS status for GM foods was not arbitrary and capricious, the court noted that the GRAS determination must be based on technical evidence of safety, which is generally known and accepted in the scientific community. The court deferred to the FDA's evaluation of scientific data within its area of expertise.
122
The FDCA does not require the FDA to be informed about the additions of substances that manufacturers consider to be GRAS. 123 The FDA uses a notification procedure outlined in a 1997 regulatory proposal, which has not yet been promulgated. 124 Under that procedure, any person can notify the FDA of a claim that a particular use of a substance is exempt from premarket approval as GRAS. The FDA responds to GRAS notices, but an FDA response does not constitute approval. This means that companies themselves must decide whether a new food substance is GRAS or whether it is a food additive that requires FDA approval. 120 
Labelling
The FDA does not require labels for most GM foods. 126 The FDCA defines a food as 'misbranded' if 'its labeling is false or misleading in any particular'. 127 A factor in determining whether a label is misleading is 'the extent to which the labeling ... fails to reveal [material] facts ...'. 128 The FDA has interpreted the term 'material' to refer to attributes of the food product and has required special labels only when the absence of information could pose health or environmental risks, mislead the consumer, or allow the consumer to believe, wrongly, that one food has nutritional, functional, or other characteristics similar to another food. 129 The FDA did not consider the methods used to develop new plant varieties to be material information under the FDCA, and the development of GM foods did not change the Agency's opinion. 130 not aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.
Moreover, the FDA was 131 Therefore, GM products need not be identified as GM unless the food itself differs significantly from similar foods -for example, in its nutritional content or the presence of an allergen. 132 In a case that challenged the FDA's interpretation of 'material', the court upheld the FDA's determination that genetic modification is not a material fact that requires labelling. Because consumers may be interested in whether food has been genetically modified, however, the FDA published a Draft Guidance to help industry ensure that voluntary labelling is truthful and does not mislead consumers. The document gives examples of statements that could be used on food labels without causing the label to be misleading and the food therefore misbranded. products from the market.
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III EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATION OF GM CROPS
140
A complex and interrelated system of Directives and Regulations, designed to ensure that authorised GMOs do not threaten health or the environment, governs GMOs and their food and feed products. In 1990, the European Community introduced a process-based regulatory system that requires caseby-case authorisation of GMOs and follows a step-by-step process of decreasing containment. Later amendments and new measures strengthened the regulatory system, adding requirements for traceability and labelling, with thresholds for applicability to ensure that producers and consumers enjoy freedom of choice between GM and other crops. Nonetheless, the process of authorisation, interrupted by a lengthy (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 153 Directive 2001/18 defines a GMO as 'an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination'. 154 General provisions -for example, confidentiality and consultation requirementsapply to all GMOs. 155 Moreover, anyone who plans to seek authorisation to release a GMO must carry out an environmental risk assessment, which evaluates potential adverse effects of the release on human health and the environment using principles for risk assessment set out in the Directive. 156 Directive 2001/18 implements a step-by-step principle:
[t]he containment of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release increased gradually, step by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier steps in terms of protection of human health and the environment indicates that the next step can be taken. 157 The Directive therefore governs the deliberate release of GMOs in two steps: first for 'any other purpose than for placing on the market' (for example, field tests) and then for 'placing on the market of GMOs as or in products' (that is, the sale of GMOs or their products). 158 Deliberate release at the research stage is one of the steps preliminary to marketing, because GMOs must be field tested in appropriate ecosystems. Member States, through their competent authorities, authorise releases for field testing or other research under the procedure and time frames specified in the Directive. 159 No release is permitted without written consent from the competent authority. After the release, the notifier reports results, especially concerning risk to health or the environment, to the competent authority. 160 Member States must establish registers to record the location of releases for field tests and for releases of GMOs that have been approved and placed on the market. 161 Registration of the use of approved GMOs is intended, in part, to facilitate monitoring of their effect on the environment. The locations of releases and environmental risk assessments are to be made known to the public. 162 In February 2009, the European Court of Justice held that the public may request all information relating to the locations of releases submitted to the competent authority in the Member State. It also held that such information may not be withheld under an exception to disclosure relating to protection of the public order.
163
B Placing GMOs on the Market
An authorised GMO may be used 'without further notification throughout the community', and Member States may not 'prohibit, restrict or impede the placing on the market of [authorised] GMOs, as or in products'. 164 Therefore the process of placing GMOs and their products on the market is more complicated than authorisation of experimental releases and involves the Commission, EFSA, and the competent authorities of all Member States. 
GMOs -Directive 2001/18
Authorisation begins with notification to the Member State competent authority, with information about the GMO, an environmental risk assessment, a plan for post-release monitoring, 166 conditions for use and handling of the product, a summary of the dossier, and other information. 167 If, after examining the notification for compliance with the Directive and preparing an assessment report, the Member State authority concludes that the GMO should be placed on the market, the authority sends the dossier summary, along with its assessment report, to the Commission and to the competent authorities of the other Member States. 168 States may ask for information, make comments, or present 'reasoned objections'. 169 If no objections are made, or if issues are resolved, the competent authority may give written consent to the notifier. 170 Written consent must include specific conditions for use, handling and packaging of the GMO or for protection of the environment, labelling requirements, and obligations for monitoring.
171
Written consent is given for a maximum of 10 years and can be renewed. If the scientific decision is favourable, the Commission will follow the Community inter-agency regulatory procedure, the so-called comitology procedure, to reach a decision. Commission consent has authorised GMOs under a comitology procedure since 2004 introduce national provisions 'based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment ... on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure'. 180 The Commission must determine whether the Member State provisions discriminate or restrict trade and whether they interfere with the internal market. 181 Relying on this Treaty provision, Austria proposed to ban cultivation of approved GMOs in Upper Austria, justifying its measure as a means to protect traditional and organic production systems, nature, the environment and biodiversity. Its proposed ban was rejected, both by the Commission and in subsequent litigation. 184 The Scientific Panel on GMOs plays a major role. 185 Under the 'one door-one key' principle, a single application may cover a GMO and food or feed containing or consisting of that GMO. and feed, and products likely to be used as both food and feed may be authorised under a single application.
187
Regulation 1829/2003 governs GMOs for food use, food containing or consisting of GMOs, and food produced from or containing ingredients produced from GMOs. 188 Its requirements apply in a 'non-discriminatory manner' to both Community and imported products. 189 Products that are produced with a GMO but have no GM material in the end product (for example, food made with GM processing or products from animals fed with GM feed) are excluded from regulation. 190 GMOs to be used as seeds are governed by other measures.
191
GM food authorised under Regulation 1829/2003 must have no adverse effects on health or the environment, and it must not mislead the consumer or differ in a nutritionally adverse way from the food it replaces. 192 Authorisation involves a scientific evaluation followed by a risk management decision. 193 EFSA prepares its opinion on the basis of scientific analysis and consultation with experts and, for GMOs under the one door-one key procedure, with Member State competent authorities. After notice and comment, the Commission submits a draft decision on the authorisation to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. 194 The inter-agency regulatory procedure, mentioned above, is used to reach final decision on the application. for ten years and can be renewed. 196 The Community Register of Genetically Modified Food and Feed lists authorised GM foods. 197 
C
Traceability and Labelling
Both traceability and labelling are important food safety measures for the European Union, and Regulations enacted in 2003 harmonise these requirements.
Traceability
The 2002 General Food Law requires that business operators implement systems and procedures (including labelling) to ensure traceability of food, feed, and food-producing animals. 198 For GMOs specifically, Directive 2001/18 emphasises the importance of traceability 199 and requires labelling. Consent to place a GMO on the market is contingent on compliance with labelling requirements, including a statement that 'this product contains genetically modified organisms'. 200 Regulation 1830/2003 is more specific. Building on Directive 2001/18, it defines traceability as 'the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market through the production and distribution chains'. 201 Traceability is essential to ensure proper labelling, monitor environmental and health effects, implement risk management measures, and, if necessary, to withdraw food products from the market.
202
The Regulation applies a unified system of traceability to products consisting of or containing GMOs, as well as food and feed produced from GMOs.
If products consist of or contain GMOs, operators (those who place a product on the market or receive a product placed on the market) 204 must transmit prescribed information in writing at the first and all subsequent stages of placing on the market. Two types of information are prescribed: a statement that the product contains or consists of GMOs and the unique identifier(s) assigned to the GMOs. Operators must preserve this information and the identity of those from whom the products were received and to whom they were made available for five years from each transaction. Pre-packaged products must have a statement on a label (for example, 'This product contains genetically modified organisms'), and a display of bulk products offered to the final consumer must include similar language.
205 For food and feed produced from GMOs, the operator must indicate in writing each food ingredient produced from GMOs. If no list of ingredients exists, the operator must indicate that the product is produced from GMOs. The same five-year retention period applies. 206 Implementation of Regulation 1830/2003 requires a system of unique identifiers for GMOs, established by the Commission. 207 All GMOs placed on the market are to have a unique identifier, specified in the consent for that GMO. 208 The applicant for a new GMO develops the unique identifier, 209 
Coexistence
Producers prefer to keep the adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM crops and products below the regulatory threshold to avoid the obligation to label products as GMOs. Thus, it is critical to develop and implement management and marketing practices to ensure that pollen drift or commingling do not result in adventitious presence of GMOs and that various systems of agriculture (traditional, GM, and organic) can coexist. 218 For the European Commission, the term coexistence 'refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or purity standards'.
219
In a 2003 Recommendation, the Commission issued policy guidelines for coexistence. 220 The Commission did not require any particular type of policy instrument, but welcomed voluntary agreements, legislation, soft law, or a combination of these instruments, designed to 'achieve effective implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and control of the measures'.
221
Commission guidelines, which apply 'from the seed to the silo', are nonbinding recommendations that address commercial seed and crop production, with a focus on technical segregation measures and economic consequences of admixtures of GM and non-GM crops. They are not measures to be adopted, but instead offer Member States general principles to apply and factors to consider in designing national measures. For example, the Commission suggested that management measures be based on the best available scientific evidence, which would permit cultivation of both GM and non-GM crops and ensure that adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM crops remains below labelling thresholds. Measures should emphasise farm-scale management and encourage cooperation and voluntary arrangements between farmers. Moreover, operators who introduce a new production type should be responsible for limiting gene flow, and farmers who plan to grow GM varieties should inform neighbours. In addition, the 218 particularly long-term environmental effects. That review should consider environmental consequences of changes in herbicide use in connection with herbicide-tolerant GMOs and examine the 'coherence' between risk assessments of GM plants that produce pesticides and of the pesticides themselves. 232 The Council noted that Member State assessment practices should be harmonised, and that new procedures should ensure that GMOs are monitored effectively after commercialisation. Moreover, the Council would like an assessment of the socio-economic benefits and risks of GMOs, which can be considered in risk management. Member State information about socio-economic effects should lead to a Commission report to Council and Parliament. The Council emphasised the important role of Member States in the assessment of GMOs for cultivation and encouraged the more effective and transparent use of scientific expertise in assessing risks of cultivation of GMOs or their use in food and feed. 233 The Council noted that the Commission will complete a study on the establishment of seed thresholds and reaffirmed the need for labelling thresholds for the adventitious presence of GMOs in conventional seeds. The Council insisted that thresholds should be 'at the lowest practicable, proportionate and functional levels for all economic operators, [and] must contribute to ensuring freedom of choice to producers and consumers of conventional, organic and GM products alike'. 234 Finally, the Council focused on regional and local characteristics of Member States. The Council recognised the possibility, consistent with the precautionary principle, The Council invited the Commission to set those thresholds as soon as possible, using current scientific information.
IV AUTHORISATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARISON
A Attitudes toward GMOs
Attitudes towards GM crops and foods differ significantly in the United States and the European Community, and those attitudes may influence aspects of the regulatory process. Government policy in the United States is generally positive toward GMOs and poses few obstacles to their widespread cultivation and consumption. The European Community officially favours GMOs, 237 too, though a Commission report indicated that 'the EU is often not at the forefront of development, eg in ... GM crops'. 238 Moreover, attitudes of producers and consumers contrast. In the United States, producers favour GMOs, as evidenced by statistics indicating that the majority of corn, soybean, and cotton hectares are GM.
Despite official policy, and in violation of EC law, several Member States and numerous regions have banned cultivation of GM crops. 239 In the European Community, where only GM maize can be cultivated and few producers actually grow the GM maize, many farmers are dubious about GM crops. Yet in some Member States, farmers are eager to grow GM crops; in Denmark, for example, farmers would like to grow GM maize and a GM potato. 240 Similarly, most consumers in the United States seem to have positive or, at worst, neutral attitudes towards GMOs. Though consumers are not always well-informed about GM food products, few avoid GM foods or express concerns about the safety of biotech food, and a majority would buy GM foods. 241 Until recently, however, US consumers have faced few food safety issues, and most consumers have little reason to mistrust the federal agencies that regulate GMOs. In contrast, the BSE crisis 242 237 Commission, above n 11. and other food crises in Europe have triggered consumer mistrust of government and even science, so consumer hesitation about GMOs, even in the face of comprehensive regulation, is not surprising. Consumers have continued to trust NGOs, including Greenpeace, 243 an organisation that opposes GMOs. One scholar suggested that 'GM politics in the EU can be understood partially as a defensive strategy of authorities to regain credibility with the public ... '. 244 Even with stringent regulation, however, consumer scepticism and opposition remain. In several EC Member States (for example, France, Germany, and others), vandals have destroyed field trials of GM crops, a situation that may have led to prohibition of GM research in two German universities.
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B
Regulatory Requirements
Regulatory Approaches
Both the United States and the European Community regulate GMOs and GM foods to protect public health and the environment (including agriculture). The regulatory approaches, however, differ in a number of important respects. Earlier Parts of this article provide details, and the discussion below highlights a few significant differences.
In the United States, the approach to GMOs can be characterised, in general, as product-oriented. That is, the focus is on the product itself, rather than the process (genetic modification) by which it was created. As a result, the United States has relied on existing statutes, instead of enacting new laws specifically designed for GMOs. Under those existing laws, however, some GM products may escape comprehensive review; the concepts of substantial equivalence and GRAS, discussed above, are examples. In the United States, statutory amendments, new regulations, and agency guidelines adopted since the 1980s have applied to GMOs and their products.
In contrast, the European Community adopted a process-oriented regulatory approach, which focuses on the process by which the new variety was created. Under the European Community's process-oriented regulatory approach, of course, each product is regulated, but the process of genetic modification triggers a careful look at the product. The European Community's focus on the process of genetic modification led to enactment of measures designed for GMOs, beginning in 1990. The approval process in the European Union is complex and can take twice as long as the procedure in the United States and some other nations.
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The allocation of regulatory responsibility differs. In the United States, federal law governs authorisation of GMOs and their products, and federal regulations and guidelines provide detailed requirements for authorisation. In the United States, regulation of GMOs is rather sectoral; applicable law and regulations are related to the sector (for example, agriculture, environment, food) in which the GMO or its product will be used. Agencies with expertise in that sector implement the authorisation process. These agencies coordinate their activities to avoid asynchronous authorisation; that is, the USDA will not usually deregulate a GM variety until the applicant has consulted with the FDA on food and feed uses.
In the European Community, early legislation was more horizontal (that is, not related to the proposed use of the GMO or its product), but the enactment of Regulation 1829/2003 on food and feed took a more sectoral approach. Nonetheless, the likelihood that both a GMO and its food and feed products will be authorised adds complexity because both horizontal measures (for example, the Directives for contained release and deliberate release) and sectoral measures (for example, Regulation 1829/2003) will apply. The one door-one key procedure mentioned above helps to make the authorisation process more efficient.
Labelling
Another significant difference between US and EC regulation of GMOs and their products relates to labelling. Labels facilitate traceability, and labels on food products provide information to consumers. When GM food is at issue, consumer interest may reflect ethical preferences that go beyond issues of health and safety.
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In the European Community, GMOs and their products must be labelled if GM content exceeds the rather low (0.9 per cent) threshold of GM content.
Moreover, to avoid labelling, the GM content below that threshold must be adventitious or technically unavoidable. In Europe, where consumers have expressed strong concerns about GM food, labels seem to be an important component of the consumer's right to choose.
In the United States, labels are generally not required for GMOs or their products. The FDA does not consider most GM foods to be materially different from their conventional counterparts and has therefore not required labels, despite some consumer demand. Labels can be required, however, if GM foods differ significantly from their conventional counterparts and raise health or ethical issues. 248 In a study on consumer behaviour in 10 Member States concluded in 2008, however, researchers found that 'most shoppers did not actively avoid GM products, suggesting that they are not greatly concerned with the GM issue'. 249 Consumers do want freedom of choice, but in the context of that freedom, 'GM-products offered for sale are indeed purchased'. the EPA, but some less risky GMOs and small-scale field trials get less stringent oversight. In the European Community, all GM foods are subject to a stringent environmental risk assessment with a focus on human health and environment. In the United States, the concept of substantial equivalence means that most GM foods, which do not differ significantly from their non-GM counterparts, are not assessed. Most non-pesticidal GMOs are generally recognised as safe (GRAS) and are not regulated as food additives. Yet these foods do not escape scrutiny; voluntary consultations with the FDA ensure review. 256 Risk management, which relies on data from risk assessment, determines whether a GMO or GM product will be authorised and, if so, whether special risk management measures are required. To protect the environment, both the United States and the European Union condition authorisation on the absence of adverse effects -for example, the absence of adverse effects on health or environment (EC) or the likelihood that GMOs or GM products will not pose a plant pest risk or cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment (US). The European Community, however, requires post-market monitoring of GMOs, a precaution not yet required in the US. In the European Community, no GM food can be authorised until the absence of adverse effects has been demonstrated, and post-market monitoring follows authorisation. In the United States, however, the FDA does not formally authorise most new GM foods, nor does the EPA require food residue tolerances for most PIPs. Thus, though both the European Community and the United States apply precautionary standards in assessing the risk of GMOs and their products, the EC carries the precaution beyond authorisation into the marketplace. Therefore 'the role of precaution in risk management appears to be stronger in the EC than in the US'.
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V CONCLUSION
In the years since the United States published its Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology and the European Community enacted its earliest Directives to govern GMOs, numerous GM crops and their products have been commercialised. Farmers began to plant those crops in 1996, and steady increases in GM production have occurred. The 2008 global market value (sale of seed plus technology fees) of GM crops was estimated at US $7.5 billion and is projected to be US $8.3 billion in 2009. Further increases in GM production are expected. Additional countries may cultivate GM crops, and 256 Anker and Grossman, above n 254, 14-17. 257 Ibid 14, 18-20.
the number of farmers planting biotech crops may increase significantly, especially in developing countries. New GM crops and traits will also expand production.
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Many commercialised GM crops were developed in the United States and authorised under the regulatory system described in this article. They are cultivated and consumed in the United States and in other nations. Under the lengthy approval process in the European Community, fewer GM varieties have been authorised for food, feed, or processing uses there, and only GM maize is authorised for cultivation. Thus, not all GMOs approved in the United States can be imported into Europe. Moreover, because the EU food industry is reluctant to market GM food products, most GM products sold in Europe (primarily soy and maize) are used for animal feed.
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This situation of asynchronous approvals and the European Community's strict prohibition of imports of GMOs not yet approved in the EC has engendered conflict. Two issues, discussed in reports written in Europe -one by a research group and the other by the European Commission itselfillustrate this conflict.
One issue is the availability of livestock feed. In 2007, the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development noted that European reluctance to import GM livestock feed increased the cost of feed for pigs and poultry and could threaten the livestock industry. 260 A 2008 Dutch study corroborated this statement. 261 The European livestock industry, which imports about 77 per cent of protein feed, depends on imported soy and maize products. Zero tolerance of unapproved GMOs means that livestock producers face higher costs for non-GM soy, and in some cases producers may not be able to import protein-rich feedstuffs. The lack of feed ingredients will affect the competitiveness of European Union livestock production, and 'European livestock operators will lose market share in domestic and world markets to foreign competitors'. 262 258 James, above n 2.
Because livestock production is about 40 per cent of total EU agricultural production, loss of market share will have significant financial implications. Similar issues, focused on importing non-GM raw materials, will face the food industry if it becomes more hospitable to GM foods. 263 The Dutch study concludes 'that it is likely that in the near future problems will become more urgent. This could negatively affect the EU supply of raw materials and economic position of the European agricultural and food sector'. 264 In addition, EC requirements for traceability and labelling (especially in Regulation 1830/2003) impose burdens on trading partners. According to a Commission report, Member States believe that traceability and labelling help to achieve 'more informed choice, more efficient prevention of deceptive practices and better official controls'. 265 Research indicates that traceability helps to foster confidence in food safety and to encourage sale of non-GM products.
266 From a different point of view, however, exporters who cannot sell GM products claim that, as a result, potential buyers are forced to buy more expensive non-GM products. Exporters find labelling thresholds arbitrary and 'claim that labelling products produced from GMOs, where no GM material can be detected, places an unfair burden on operators in the food and feed sector'. 267 The Commission disagrees, however, and believes that 'consumer demand for non-GM products, higher prices in the feed sector and asynchronous approval for GMOs between countries' have affected trade more significantly.
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Both the United States and the European Community authorise GMOs and their products under comprehensive regulatory schemes, intended to ensure that GMOs do not harm health, the environment, or agriculture. Opinions differ about the effectiveness of regulatory oversight, of course, but both regulatory schemes allow a GM variety that meets regulatory requirements to be authorised. Though EC regulatory measures seem more complex than those in the United States, differences in legal requirements, by themselves, do not seem to account for the European Community's hesitation to allow cultivation of additional GMOs or the limited number of varieties authorised for feed and food use. Instead, underlying attitudes of producers and These different viewpoints highlight the controversy about the impact of EC traceability and labelling requirements. 263 Ibid. 264 concern at the fact that EU food processors and retailers had stopped using soybean oil from the US, because the resulting food and feed products would be labeled as GM even if no DNA from the modification appears in the oil, and deplored the fact that such products required labelling': at 4. 268 Ibid 7.
